Recent Trends in the Criminal Law by unknown
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 64 | Issue 1 Article 5
1973
Recent Trends in the Criminal Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
This Criminal Law is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Recent Trends in the Criminal Law, 64 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 87 (1973)
TE JOURNAL OF CRInnNAL LAw AND CuMoNooaY
Copyright 0 1973 by Northwestern University School of Law
RECENT TRENDS IN THE CRIMINAL LAW
POLYGRAPH EXAMINATIONS
In United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90
(E.D. Mich. 1972), and People v. Cutler, 12 BNA
Cnrx. L. REP. 2133 (Los Angeles County Ct.
Nov. 6, 1972), trial courts admitted the results
of polygraph examinations into evidence in
criminal cases.
1
In Ridling, the defendant was indicted for com-
mitting perjury before a grand jury. At trial, the
defendant offered the testimony of polygraph
experts purportedly demonstrating that he had not
perjured himself. The court indicated that it would
accept the expert testimony, provided that cer-
tain conditions, discussed below, were met.
2
In Cutler, the defendant was charged with
illegal possession of marijuana. The defendant
moved at a pre-trial hearing to exclude the mari-
juana on the ground that it was illegally seized.
The factual issue at the hearing was whether the
defendant had voluntarily submitted to the
search, on which point the defendant's testimony
and that of the police officer directly conflicted.
The defendant offered into evidence the results
of a polygraph examination which he had taken
purporting to show that he was telling the truth.
After hearing testimony on the reliability of the
polygraph, the court accepted the proffered evi-
dence, excluding, on the basis of that evidence, the
seized marijuana.
In 1923, Frye v. United States4 held polygraph
evidence inadmissible, reasoning that the poly-
graph had not gained sufficient acceptance among
physiological and psychological experts. The courts
in Ridling and Cutler determined that polygraph
testing had been substantially improved since Frye
and concluded that, as a result of more advanced
equipment and testing techniques, the polygraph
2 In another recent case, United States v.Zeiger,350F.
Supp.685(D.D.C. 1972), a trial judg admitted a de-
fendant's proffered polygraph evidence. This ruling,
however, was reversed on expedited appeal, per curiam
and without opinion._.F.2d_ (D.C. Cir. 1972).
2The trial judge in Ridfing noted that a perjury
case is ideally suited for admitting polygraph evidence.
Perjury is based on wilfully or knowingly giving false
evidence, which is exactly what the polygraph ex-
amination is designed to test.
3Experts testifying on the theory and uses of poly-
graph data indicated that polygraph tests are more
than 90% accurate.
4 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
has attained general acceptance as an effective
instrument for detecting deception. Thus, each
court decided that it was no longer controlled by
Frye.
5
Both courts also faced the issue of whether the
proffered evidence should be excluded on the
ground that the jury might consider the poly-
graph examiner's opinion conclusive on the issue
of guilt or innocence, thus intruding on the jury's
fact-finding role.8 In Ridling, the trial judge con-
ceded that in a perjury case the polygraph evi-
dence might well prove conclusive. The court,
however, reasoned that the evidence was so highly
probative that its use would benefit both the
defendant and society. The court analogized
polygraph evidence to other admissible scientific
evidence, such as blood and breathalizer tests in
intoxification cases and radar data in speeding
cases. In such cases, the court noted, the scientific
evidence virtually decides the factual issue, but is
admitted because of its high probative value and
objectivity.
In Ridling, the court established a stringent set
of standards governing the admissibility of poly-
graph evidence in ordir to lessen the possibility
that a jury might give too much weight to such
data and to prevent fraud or mistake by the
polygraph examiner. Since there are only minimum
standards for polygraph operators, the court
thought it might be difficult to adequately de-
termine the reliability of the defendant's evidence.
Therefore, the court decided to appoint its own
expert witness to test the defendant. The court
ruled that if the defendant refused to be tested by
the court's expert, his polygraph evidence would
not be admitted. Furthermore, the court ordered
that if the court-appointed examiner was unable to
determine whether the defendant was telling the
truth,7 none of the polygraph evidence would be
5 These holdings do not conflict with Frye, but rather
meet the test Frye established for admitting expert
scientific testimony.
6See People v. Davis, 343 Mich. 348, 72 N.W.2d 269
(1955), and People v. Leone, 25 N.Y.2d 511, 255
N.E.2d 696 (1969), where polygraph data was rejected
on the ground that it intruded on the fact-finding role
of the jury.
'In 6% of properly administered polygraph ex-
aminations, the examiner is unable to determine if the
subject is telling the truth. The court thought that if
its expert felt the defendant was in this group so much
doubt would be cast on the defendant's evidence that
it should be excluded.
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admitted. However, if these conditions were met,
the testimony of both the defendant's experts and
the court's experts would be admitted, even though
conflicting.
In Cutler, the court did not establish such rigo-
rous conditions for the admissibility of polygraph
evidence, perhaps because the evidence was not
heard by a jury. Cutler, however, cited Ridling
for the proposition that courts have sufficient
authority to control, limit, or condition the intro-
duction of polygraph evidence in order not to
prejudice the trial process. It is possible, therefore,
that the Cutler court might institute controls simi-
lar to those in Ridling if a jury were to hear the
polygraph evidence.
Because the Ridling court conditioned admission
of defendant's polygraph evidence on his submit-
ting to tests by a court-appointed expert, it exam-
ined the relationship between polygraph tests and
the privilege against self-incrimination. The privi-
lege issue could arise either if the court-appointed
expert testified in rebuttal to the defendant's
expert or if polygraph testimony was offered inde-
pendently by the prosecutor. The court pointed
out three reasons why the privilege would not
ordinarily bar polygraph evidence. First, the privi-
lege can be waived. If proper Miranda warnings
are given, the court felt that the taking of the test
would constitute a waiver. Second, the privilege
may not be involved at all. The court compared
taking a polygraph test to such nontestimonial
evidence as participating in a lineup, fingerprint-
ing or giving blood to determine alcohol content.8
The court, of course, conceded that the defendant's
responses to the examiner's questions would be
testimonial evidence which would be excluded if
Miranda warnings were not given. However, the
court stated that if the statements made during the
polygraph test are admissible under Miranda, the
privilege is not violated by eliciting physiological
nontestimonial evidence at the same time. Third,
the very nature of the polygraph examination pro-
tects against violation of the privilege against self-
incrimination. For a polygraph test to be scien-
tifically valid, the defendant must voluntarily co-
operate with the examiner. Thus, if the defendant
is coerced in any manner to participate in a poly-
8 Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), and
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), held that
handwriting exemplars and blood tests, respectively,
are nontestimonial and therefore not protected by the
fifth amendment privilege.
graph test, the results of that test would be inad-
missible since they would be scientifically invalid.
The Ridling court also held that polygraph evi-
dence does not violate the hearsay rule. The hear-
say problem arises because the polygraph examiner
must, to make his testimony relevant, report out-
of-court statements of the defendant. The court
contended, however, that the evidence is admissi-
ble because the questions of the examiner and the
answers of the defendant are not received into
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
On the contrary, the answers have probative value
only as evidence of the physiological response of the
defendant as interpreted by the expert witness.
Thus, the testimony admitted is merely the opinion
of the expert on what he observes concerning the
defendant's physiological responses and what he
concludes regarding the truthfulness of the de-
fendant. In any event, the court would admit
polygraph tests as an exception to the hearsay
rule because of their proven trustworthiness.9
Both the Ridling and Cutler courts recognized
that admitting polygraph evidence will have a
profound effect on the criminal justice system.
The Ridling court thought it likely that far fewer
cases would reach the trial stage if the polygraph
is used by the prosecution and the defense. Many
cases will be dismissed if the defendant is cleared
by a polygraph examination while the likelihood
of guilty pleas will be increased if he is not. As the
Cutler court pointed out, the great majority of
criminal trials turn on the credibility of witnesses
and to the extent that the polygraph aids courts in
measuring credibility, the criminal justice system
will be both more efficient and more just for de-
fendants and society.
LiNEups AND RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Last Term the United States Supreme Court
held in Kirby v. Illinois'0 that the sixth amend-
ment right to counsel does not attach at lineups
until adversary judicial criminal proceedings
against the defendant have commenced. State
courts have given effect to this ruling in various
ways.
In Commonwealth v. Lopes, -Mass.-., 287
N.E.2d 118 (1972), the lineup in question took
place after the defendant's arrest but before he
"See FED. R. Ev. 803(24) (1971 Revised Draft),
which states that inherently trustworthy evidence is
admissible even if it would normally be inadmissible as
hearsay.
10 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
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had been indicted or otherwise formally charged
with any criminal offense. Although the trial
judge found that the defendant waived his right
to counsel at the lineup, the Massachusetts court
found it unnecessary to rule on the waiver issue,
reasoning, under Kirby, that the right to counsel
had not attached. Lopes reversed the pre-Kirby
rule in Massachusetts that a pre-indictment lineup
is a critical stage in a criminal prosecution and
therefore the right to counsel attaches when the
defendant participates in such an identification."
The earlier Massachusetts rule was based on an
expansive reading of United States v. Wade 2 and
Gilbert v. California," which held that an in-court
identification of the defendant is inadmissible in
evidence if its source was a lineup at which the
defendant's right to counsel had been denied.
These cases have been thought to establish a
per se rule excluding identification since no direct
showing of unfairness at the lineup is required.
Lopes limits application of a per se exclusionary
rule to post-indictment lineups.
Chandler v. State, 501 P.2d 512 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1972), also involved a post-arrest, pre-arraign-
ment lineup. Prior to Kirby the Oklahoma rule was
that the right to counsel attached at pre-indict-
ment lineups.14 Although the court in Chandler
realized that after Kirby there is no constitutional
right to counsel at pre-indictment or pre-informa-
" See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Guillory, 356 Mass.
591, 254 N.E.2d 427 (1970).
'2388 U.S. 218 (1968).
13 388 U.S. 263 (1968).
" State v. Thompson, 438 P.2d 287 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1968).
tion lineups, it nevertheless required that before
any lineup is conducted the suspect be given the
right to contact an attorney or be informed that
one will be called if he is unable to hire one. The
court felt that counsel was necessary to prevent
lineups which are unnecessarily suggestive. 15 To
this extent the Oklahoma court read Kirby nar-
rowly, and reiterated that, for a lawful lineup,
counsel must be present or the right to counsel
affirmatively waived.
A third case interpretating Kirby is Arnold v.
State, 484 S.W.2d 248 (Mo. 1972). The questioned
lineup occurred after a complaint charging the
defendant had been filed and a warrant issued for
his arrest, but before an indictment or information
had been filed.
Nevertheless, the court ruled that filing a com-
plaint and issuing a warrant initiate "adversary
criminal proceedings" within the meaning of
Kirby, so that the right to counsel attaches at that
point.
Although Arnold ostensibly relies directly on the
Court's opinion in Kirby, the result conforms
more closely to the dissenting opinion of Justice
Marshall. justice Marshall contended that counsel
for lineups attaches at arrest, since possibre abuses
involved in identification procedures are the same
whether the lineup occurs before or after indict-
ment. The Arnold court's definition of adversary
judicial proceedings seemingly adopts Marshall's
view, since practically nothing more than arrest
bad occurred in the case.
5 The court cited Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293
(1967), which held that due process prohibits suggestive
lineups.
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